For the problem of cheaters in secret sharing schemes, we introduce d cheat which is more appropriate than the minimum Hamming distance d min of the related error correcting code when it is needed only to recover the correct secret s (i.e., when it is not needed to identify the cheaters in the scheme). We then prove that d min d cheat = n ? max B6 2? jBj; where ? denotes the access structure.
Introduction
In secret sharing schemes, cheaters may open forged shares so that honest participants would recover a forged secret. This problem is closely related to error correcting codes. Let C be the set of possible (v 1 ; ; v n ), where v i is a share of participant P i . Let d min denote the minimum Hamming distance of the error correcting code C. Then cheaters can be identi ed from (v 1 ; ; v n ) i up to b(d min ? 1)=2c participants are cheaters. McEliece and Sarwate 8] showed that d min = n ? k + 1: for Shamir's (k; n)-threshold scheme 11] . Karnin et al. showed this equality for any ideal (k; n)-threshold scheme 6, p.40, right, l.7]. ( 2] showed another proof.) On the other hand, (k; n)-threshold schemes were generalized to perfect secret sharing schemes for monotone access structures ? 5, 1] , where ? is a set of all subsets of participants which can determine the secret.
In this paper, we rst introduce a new distance measure d cheat . This new measure is more appropriate than d min when it is needed only to recover the correct secret s (i.e., when it is not needed to identify the cheaters in the scheme 
Finally, we prove that there exists a perfect MDS secret sharing scheme for any monotone ?. This means that our bound is tight. Some researchers have studied cheater identi cation schemes and cheating detection schemes which allow small error probability 14, 12, 10, 3, 4, 7, 9] . However, note that we study schemes with zero error probability.
Preliminary
For a set X, let X denote the random variable taking values on the set X with respect to a probability distribution on X. H(X) denotes the Shanon entropy.
We can compactly write that H(X) = 0 when we wish to express the fact that there exists a unique x 2 X such that Pr(X = x) = 1.
Secret sharing scheme
Let P = fP 1 ; : : : ; P n g be a set of participants. Let S denote the set of secrets and V i denote the set of shares of participant P i .
In a secret sharing scheme, on input a secret s 2 S, a dealer D chooses (v 1 ; : : : ; v n ) randomly and gives v i 2 V i to P i so that only quali ed subsets of participants (access subset) can recover the secret. Let 
New Distance Measure d cheat
In this section, we introduce a new distance measure d cheat . This new measure is more appropriate than d min if we are only interested in \recovering the correct secret s". We then show that the value of d cheat is determined only from the access structure ?.
Note that there exists a unique secret s such that Pr(S = s j V P = c) = 1 for any c 2 support(V 1 ; ; V n ) since P 2 ?. We denote such s by Sec(c).
De nition 3. From this de nition, we obtain the following theorems immediately. We will prove that this new secret sharing scheme is perfect and MDS in the next subsection.
MDS secret sharing scheme exists for any ?
In this subsection, we prove that the above scheme is a perfect MDS secret sharing scheme. Let X i;j be the random variable induced by x i;j . For any A P, where A = fP i 1 ; : : : ; P i j g, let X i;A be the random variable which takes a value of possible (x i;i 1 ; : : : ; x i;i j ). Further, let U i ; U A be the random variables of shares in our new scheme de ned in the same way. 
For P i 2 A, AnfP i g is a non-access set in the Shamir's (l+1; n?1)-threshold scheme with v i as the secret because jA n fP i gj < l. Therefore it holds that H(X i;AnfP i g jV i ) = H(X i;AnfP i g ):
Without loss of generality, we suppose that A = fP 1 ; : : : ; P l g. 
The last equality holds from Eq.(5). Further, for the j-th term in RHS of Eq.(6) where l + 1 j n, it holds that H(X j;A ) H(X j;A jV A X 1;AnfP 1 g X l+1;A ) H(X j;A jV j ) = H(X j;A ) (8) The last equality holds from Eq.(4). Therefore, from Eq.(6), Eq. (7) 
